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Human Rights in Chinese History
and Chinese Philosophy
Chung-ying Cheng
G e n e r a l Remarks
Human rights seem characterized by the following conditions:
(1) human rights are proclaimed or declared in a bill or declaration
in the process of revolution or as a result of violent struggle against
political suppression or dictatorial rule; (2) human rights include a
group of freedoms-to and freedoms-from which are basic or essential for a free-acting and free-thinking individual; (3) human rights
are claimed against, and are forced upon the recognition of, a
political authority by representatives of the people and are requests
to be secured or provided by such a political authority.
Though these basic conditions may not exhaustively describe any
given declaration of rights, they embody the main aspects
(genetical, contentual, and sanctional) of formal announcements of
human rights such as Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of Right
(1628), the Bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1701), the
Virginia Bill of Rights (1776), the Declaration of Independence
(1776), the Declaration of Human Rights and Civic Rights (1789),
the Emancipation Proclamation (1893), and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Each of these declarations
clearly records a triumph over absolute power or dictatorship.
Each marks an awakening of political consciousness of the intrinsic
worth of individual dignity and the extreme desperation of man
when deprived of his rights. Further, each of these declarations of
human rights presupposes a preceding background of philosophical
doctrines which makes its phrasing and articulation possible, and
which at the same time pro.Ides its justification.
In light of this brief statement concerning the existence and
history of human rights in the West, one may raise many questions
regarding the existence of human rights in Chinese history and
Chinese society. Are there comparable declarations of human
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rights in the long history of China? How does dynastic change affect the human rights of the people? Are human rights articulated in
philosophy and other intellectual opinions in China? How did different classes in Chinese society develop consciousness of human
rights? What are the philosophical and political positions of these
different classes concerning human rights? In what way can
Chinese people in their institutions and behavior be said to reflect a
consciousness of human rights? Specifically, how did Chinese
social and political philosophy accommodate questions of human
rights? Are there different human rights for different classes of
people? On different occasions? What are the principles governing
such differences?
Are there conflicts among these different
groups? How are such conflicts resolved? In this paper I shall not
be able to answer all these questions, but will instead address
myself to the task of describing the political and social reality and
interpreting it philosophically so as to give the questions a proper
context. In many cases the answers to some of these questions are
obvious; in other cases one has to draw his own conclusions. One
statement can be made at the outset: there is never in traditional
Chinese history any explicit declaration of human rights in the sense
in which there are declarations of human rights in Western
history.
The formation of ancient Chinese society before the first
millenium B.C. and its gradual evolution into a state are the starting point for understanding the specific status of human rights in
Chinese history, because it is from these sources and developments
that later the political consciousness and political systems arose
which subtly yet powerfully dominated Chinese society for the next
three millennia. In the antiquity of the Shang 3 and early Chou b
periods (Shang: 15607-1066? B.C.; Chou: 1066-771 B.C.), China
had already formed a state on the basis of the consolidation of
large tribes under a ruling clan. The king and his diviners (who
were needed for counsel, foretelling, and rationalization) formed
the ruling class; their subjects included slaves acquired through
wars of conquest.' Whereas slaves definitely had no freedom and
were as a rule forced to engage in labor and production, the ruled
subjects in general were individuals who labored but were not
necessarily enslaved. So far as these subjects are concerned, there is little
evidence that they did not enjoy a large measure of freedom and
rights as a collective entity referred to as minc or shu-min11 (people).
In the absence of details, we may mention three important facts
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about the nature of human rights in ancient China.
(1) The term min or shu-min is a collective term referring to the
totality of the ruled people who labor and reclaim land but are not
necessarily slaves. The king and his assistants, while ruling their
min and being supported by them, are enjoined not to suppress
them. That the king should be benevolent to his people is considered a virtue (tC) which the king should preserve in order to
hold his rule. Indeed the ancestors of the Shang rulers urge: " D o
not treat the people (min) cruelly." 3
(2) That the virtue of the rulers is to protect the people is reinforced by ancestral worship and the worship of Heaven (t'ien1) or the
Heavenly Ruler or High Lord (7V). It was suggested that Heaven
or 77 has a special regard for all people because they are born from
Heaven. It is said in the Book of Poetry, "Heaven gives life to all
people, things exist, and there are regularities." 5 In a religious sense
therefore, 'people' can have a claim to an important place in the
world.
(3) In the Grand Norm of Shang Shuh it is suggested that the
people have a say in deciding matters of state by means of interpreting results of divination: "If you [the King] have great doubt,
consult your mind, consult your minister, consult your subjects
['the people'], consult your diviners." 4 Of course, 'the people'
(subjects) may not include the servants working in the fields.
The clan-dominated and family-centered society of the Shang
became even more stratified by class and status distinctions in the
Chou Kingdom. The political power of Chou was founded on a
complicated feudal structure initiated by the founders of Chou.
The land under the son of Heaven" (t'ien tzu,' of Chou) was
divided among the royal lords, each of which in turn has his own
fief deputies or ministers. The orderly hierarchy of feudal rule in
Chou seems to have led to a sharp class separation between the
ruling class and the ruled, of which the lowest class is still the
people. Since the land belonged to each fief and was cultivated by
rankless subjects, in that sense the land need not be said to have
been privately owned. The cultivating serf belonged to each fief
and lacked any economic basis to develop ideas about rights or
freedoms. They relied on the ruler or the ruling class to protect and
preserve them. That they were to be both protected and controlled
is clearly reflected in the following two important developments:
(a) Before Chou took over the rule from Shang, the Chou people
believed that the Shang ancestors were favored by the High Lord
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(77) and thus had received the Mandate of Heaven (t'ien-ming') for
their rule.® But after the Chou established its rule, it regarded itself
as having received the Mandate. 6 The Chou people realized that
the Mandate of Heaven did not stay permanently; it could be lost
or changed, and the reason why a kingdom might lose its mandate
of rule was loss of virtue (te). Te is not the will of God but the
ability to hold on to the rule by following the advice of one's ancestor's. Thus they realized that "the good and bad fortunes are
not decided by man; whether Heaven bestows calamity or blessings
depends on one's virtue.'"
" W h a t spirits rely on (for their
judgments) a r e te"Spirits
of God do not simply love men; it is
man's virtue on which their favor depends." 9 " T h e ruling
Heaven does not have relatives; it is only te which is its assistant.'" 0
This means that the rulers must do everything in their power to
illustrate te in order to maintain their rule (i.e., the Mandate of
Heaven).
As they realize that the rule ultimately depends upon the support of
the people (min), it becomes obvious that the te of the rulers consists in treating people in such a way that they naturally rally to
support the ruler, and that the Mandate of Heaven can be reduced
to the Mandate of People. The Chou statesman thus came finally
to the consciousness that people as a whole are the mainstay for
political rule and must be respected rather than exploited: "Heaven
sees through the seeing of people; Heaven hears through the
hearing of people."" " W h a t people desire, Heaven must listen to
i t . ' " 2 This of course does not imply that certain rights of the
people (or human rights for the class of min) are recognized or instituted by the people themselves, or that they are officially
proclaimed or observed by the rulers. No attempt was made to
spell out clearly what was best for the people, in fact, until Confucius and Mencius.' 3
Furthermore, knowledge of the way to show te was considered a matter of moral wisdom derived from history and practical prudence derived from experience. The doctrine of te was not
instituted as a guarantee against the abuse of absolutism on the part
of the ruler. On the other hand, we need not underestimate the
moral force of the doctrine of te in Chinese political consciousness.
In the Spring and Autumn periods (722-481 B.C.), it became so
prevalent and influential that the idea of the sanction of political
rule by Heaven or God was rendered obsolete. It was said that
"people are the master of gods,'" 4 and that "if a state is to
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prosper, (the King) listens to people; if a state is to perish, (the
King) listens to G o d . ' " 5 In Chou Liv, a later work in the Warring
States period (403-221 B.C.), it was required that the King consult
people on matters relating to the survival of the state, matters
related to the moving of the capital, and matters related to the institution of a ruler.
The collective right of people as a group to be well-treated by
their ruler and the collective right of people to be able to participate
in the maintenance of political rule are thus established as a moral
principle and a social necessity for any political rule. This, of course,
might have led to the development of a full doctrine of human
rights under more propitious circumstances.
(b) Because of the stability of the Chou rule, based on its feudal
structure, the distinctions between the ruling class and the ruled
class were increasingly accepted as a social datum. In order to
maintain the orderly distinction between these two classes, and in
order to make the hierarchy of ranks among the ruling class function according to definite and yet morally sanctionable norms,
there was introduced on the one hand, the rule of proprieties (//'),
a system of norms intended to govern the conduct of the ruling
dukes, ministers, and landowners; and, on the other hand, the rule
by the code of punishment (hsing m ), intended to govern the conduct
of the rankless subjects (hsiao-jen").
Li was perhaps derived from the sacrificial rites that took place
in the temples at important state functions such as funerals or the
start of expeditions. The chief nature of li is that it is considered a
mark of moral distinction as well as a mark of rank. Li was taught
as part of the ordinary course of education and expected to be embodied in one's social life and mores or social decorum. Thus its
function was to advance a higher order of moral autonomy and
cultural harmony, besides preserving the order of feudal
organization.
Li is based on the principle of reciprocity, and constitutes the
set of guaranteed correct ways of conduct in a feudal social order.
In this sense it is hierarchical and has both positive and temporal
significance. It is perhaps also intended to function as a means of
embodying te in concrete life situations so that the order of rule and
its sanction can be maintained.
Whereas li is the self-restraining power imposed on the ruling
class by themselves, the people are governed, on the whole, by a
code of punishment (hsing). Three main things can be said about
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hsing: First, hsing is to govern the class of subjects, but not to apply to those possessing the rule, just as li is not to apply to the subjects; thus, Confucianists would say: "Li does not go down to the
commoners, and hsing does not go up to the ruling ministers.'" 7 It
is also said that, " T h e rulers follow te; the ruled subjects follow the
code of punishment.'" 8 Thus, hsing is exclusively a code for the
subjects. Second, hsing as a code of punishment is not positive in
encouraging certain conduct, but is only negative in preventing certain conduct from happening, possibly to prevent conduct opposed
to the rule. In a way, the subjects are left quite free and by themselves to do what they can, in so far as they do not break the code
of punishment. Any positive rights, so far as the people are concerned, are not secured by law, but by the te of ruler, which is a
matter of personal wisdom rather than a matter of institution.
Finally, hsing seems to have been developed out of the early
treatment of captured slaves in conquering wars.
It is the
conquerors' morality toward the conquered, not toward peers or
equals. It therefore implies a certain contrast between the mastermorality and the slave-morality. Li is the master-morality devised
by the self-governing class of rulers, and hsing is the slave-morality
as imposed by the rulers on their slaves so that they should not interfere with either the rule or the rulers. Whereas li represented a
kind of political consciousness of the rulers about their rights to
rule, to own, and to demand respect from each other, hsing implies
no political awakening to rights or obligations on the part of the
ruled subjects themselves. It seems that the very distinction between li and hsing made by the rulers and the imposition of hsing on
the ruled tend to suppress the political consciousness of the ruled
subjects regarding their rights or obligations to themselves or to
each other. It was not until the feudal order broke down and rank
disintegrated because of population growth and political centralization of power in local states that the ruled subjects gradually
became politically conscious of their rights by claiming moral
equality with rulers in the cultivation of virtue. This was the time
when all classical schools of philosophy came to prosper.
Population growth and the gradual dilution of blood ties
through the ramifications of family relations from the tenth century to the seventh century led to the dissipation of both the
political authority of the Chou and the controlling power of the
feudal lords. The feudal rulers of the states were under pressure to
expand their land to accommodate this growth of the population,
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and therefore wars between the states took place in disregard of li.
The more weakened the Chou authority, the more rapid the breakdown of the ruling hierarchy and the more concentrated the power
of the state rulers and their ministers who were close to him. Each
state functioned as a unit or nucleus for expansion of land and for
consolidation of new social forces which took over the old hierarchy.
The formation of independent military states which paid lipservice to the Chou Kingdom at the same time caused the decline of
the old aristocracy, as well as the breakdown of the boundaries of
ranks, especially between the feudal ministers (ta-fu") and the ruled
subjects. Social mobility quickened because the state ru'ers wanted
talented help to expand their powers and land. In addition, the increasing tempo of manufacturing and commercial progress served
to expedite the disintegration of feudal structure and the formation
of new political entities. Iron was beginning to be used in the early
period of the Spring and Autumn. Methods of production had improved, and commodities were becoming more refined. The commercial class was on the rise, and there was need for a new mode of
life. Thus the breakdown of the old order, based on farming on
fixed land, took place. 19 The growth of the commercial class led to
the ready purchase of land, which inevitably presupposed the
feudal recognition of private ownership of land. The public land
ownership of the feudal hierarchy finally was abandoned.
The coming of the commercial class and the establishment of
private ownership of land provide a basis for the breakdown of the
distinction between the arstocratic ruling class and the ruled subject
class. Perhaps this could be better described as the emancipation of
the owned subjects of the feudal order so that they could search for
wealth and employment through their talent in the courts of state
rulers who aspired to greater political power. This meant that
education of the talented was needed and new ideas for guiding
change were welcome, and it explains why the social atmosphere
and social forces in the Spring-Autumn period were conducive to
the blossoming of a "Hundred Schools" of thought and to the
flourishing intellectual life in the succeeding period of Warring
States.
Against this general description and explanation of the social
transition, I wish to point out that the development of
philosophical schools indicated the arrival of political consciousness reacting in various ways to the reality of social change.
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The very existence of these schools already symbolized an emancipation from the past and implies an affirmation of the rights of
the lower class tc make demands and participate in the universal
change.
Among all the schools of thought which responded to social
change in the period of 600-200 B.C., Confucianism is the most
distinguished and most influential for later history. Confucius
(551-479 B.C.) himself searched for a new order and a new outlook
on life for the necessary transformation of the society. One cannot
deny that Confucius, alarmed by the rapid disintegration of the
feudal hierarchy, wished to preserve the basic values of the ancient
order. But on the other hand, Confucius answers this crisis by
proposing a moral universalization of the ancient aristocratic
values for all people, without presupposing distinctions among
feudal ranks. In this regard he is quite novel and revolutionary.
He tries to apply the system of li to all men and wished to institute
an order continuous with the past, but without its debilities (which
were created by social factors perhaps not quite intelligible to Confucius).- 0 Where Confucius fails in his inability to see that the
present social change had not yet come to its destined end and had
not yet exhausted its momentum, and therefore had not brought itself to a state where the old form could be shed and a new form
established.
The first important contribution which Confucius makes toward
the realization of general human rights is his moral universalization
of li among all men. Li is to define basic human relations independently of ranks and status. The basic relationships are those between father and son, between elder and younger brother, between a
ruler and subject, and between friends. These four relations, and
the relation between husband and wife, explicitly added by later
Confucianists in Li ChF, form the basis of the human world. Confucius sees these relationships as universal among all men, considering it both the duty and the right of a man to cultivate these
relationships to perfection. The result of such cultivation was called
te (virtue), according to which men would be able to enjoy a harmony, an orderly community, and a prosperity which would fulfill
both human nature and the norms of society. All norms which
form the content of li govern all humanity. Because men are normally equal and have a common human nature, they are thus capable
of achieving the same perfection in virtue. In this sense, if there are
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any human rights, they are implicitly affirmed in the Confucian affirmation of the moral worth of men.
The morally cultivated person is called a "superior m a n " (chuntzuq) and the morally uncultivated person is called a "small m a n "
(hsiao-jen). Man is equal in his capability to become a superior
man or to remain a small man. The ideal of the superior man seems
to suggest that the fundamental rights of man are to be recognized
in order to make it possible for a man to fulfill such an ideal. The
political system must guarantee that all men under it be capable of
becoming superior men and be treated morally equally. This may
be considered an affirmation of human rights through a moral
philosophy of man.
A second contribution made by Confucius toward the realization
of human rights is his doctrine of jen' (love, benevolence): Every
man can cultivate his nature so as to love all men and to embrace
them with benevolence. The very motto " D o not do to others what
you do not want others to do to y o u , " which gives a definition of
jen, clearly suggests that Confucius not only holds that men must
be treated equally, but that the superior man must treat them
equally in order to perfect himself: " I n order to perfect oneself,
one must perfect others; in order to establish oneself, one has to
establish others." This humanistic approach to man, independent
of rank and status, could already lead to a formulation of human
rights in the sense of a philosophical recognition of the worth of
man and his potentiality. That Confucius does not actually come
to this is perhaps due to his belief that government by a superior
man would bring such well-being and order to people that there
would not have to be any struggle for human rights. This leads to
the third point of his philosophy.
Confucius conceives the purpose of government as consisting in
preserving and multiplying the people, nourishing and enriching
their material lives, and edifying and educating them. 2 ' He has
high regard for the people and believes that a virtuous ruler should
rule by making titles correctly correspond to virtues, so that people
would know how to order themselves. 23 One may say that orderly
survival, good living and good education were conceived by Confucius as the fundamental rights of the people which were to be
guaranteed by the ruler.
This ideal of government for the people was elaborated even further by Mencius (371-289 B.C.), a later proponent of Confucian
principles. Mencius lays out a relatively detailed blueprint for a
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welfare state in which people are guaranteed material comforts,
land ownership, medical help, and education. These are considered
essentials that a good government must provide. The ground for
such recognized rights of people again is that man's nature is
good. In virtue of having a good nature and also in virtue of being
human, people are not to be treated as "beasts or birds" 2 3 (a point
which Confucius also had made), but must be given encouragement
and nourishment to develop their potential. The success or failure
of a ruler depends on the extent to which he can bring this about.
That he can bring this about is again due to the fact that he is
originally good and shares with people the same nature and can apply himself to secure these essentials for the people. This also leads
to the most important and unique point Mencius made, which also
follows as the ultimate effect of his doctrine, namely, that people
are the most important element in a state, the government the next
most important, and the ruler the least. If a ruler fails to provide
the essentials, the people have the right to remove him and to substitute someone who can. 24
At this point one can see that the Confucian philosophy advocates the ultimacy of people's rights to fulfilment. These rights
are founded in one's nature, and are thus considered inalienable
and necessary. Mencius's suggestion of the revolutionary right to
remove a ruler who harms the interests of the people strongly
reminds one of similar statements in the American Declaration of
Independence.
At the time of Mencius the Confucianists, perhaps even Mencius
himself, following suggestions by Confucius, conceived of
ancient government before the establishment of the hereditary
dynasties since the Hsia (2183-1752 B.C.?) as founded on the rule
of the sage. The sage ruler would retire and appoint a wise successor endorsed by the people. Apparently there was no theory as
to how the sage ruler was to be endorsed or selected. Unlike the
right to remove a bad tyrant by revolution, the right to institute a
ruler by election is not spelled out, perhaps not even carefully considered in Chinese history.
Thus, one does not want to say that Mencius's or Confucius's
theory of government, with its inherent guarantee of the right to
livelihood for the people, is necessarily one of democracy. The
people themselves have not through their own actions and words
affirmed their rights. The rights of the people must be recognized
and cherished by the conscientious rulers themselves, if recognized
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at all. This, perhaps, was the reason why human rights in the
humanistic tradition of Confucianism remained only partially
developed and waited to be eventually guaranteed by a sage ruler
with his jen or te.
Neither Confucius nor Mencius is able to propose how the rights
of the people are to be actually provided. Realizing this weakness in
their philosophies and rejecting Confucian humanism because of it,
the Legalists finally came to advocate a different theory. The
people are not to be guaranteed their well-being in the areas of
moral living and education, but should be organized for the purpose of fulfilling the goals of the state or the ruler. The very advocacy of law (fas) instead of li as a universal measure for the
strengthening of control and unification of China carries with it a
recognition of the equality of all people including the rulers themselves. However, it provides no rights for the people as a whole. In
Legalist philosophy, human rights are severely curtailed and
sacrificed for the external purpose of the state or ruler. The people
are downgraded and governed as if they are always on the verge of
lapsing into evil ways. This theory is obviously based on the view
that human nature is bad and selfish and that the strength of law is
absolutely superior to virtue. The people as a whole are still considered a constituent of the state, but there is no provision for their
rights. One might say that the Legalists represent the setback of the
Confucian ideal of government, which develops from the interests
of both ruler and the people.
The Legalists finally succeeded in effecting the unification of
China through the First Emperor of the Ch'in (221-207 B.C.) while
Confucius failed to carry any influence with any ruler of his time.
A ruler could immediately grasp the point of view of the Legalists,
which went hand in hand with his own point of view. However, the
people of the time, even though freed from the ancient feudal
hierarchy, could not understand Confucianism although it was intended to be a universal philosophy. This was because the people
were still dominated by ancient customs and could not see the
humanist view as advancing their interests. The profit-seeking
rulers of the time, however, could see the point of view of merchants
or men of talent and eloquence. Unfortunately, when Confucianism finally became adopted as a ruling ideology in 136 B.C.,
it again was used and adopted from the rulers' point of view. The
people had somehow failed to organize themselves in a search for a
new form of governmental succession.
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Among the other schools of thought in the same period, two
others are worth noting. The Mohists advocate the doctrine of
universal love as a means for assuring mutual benefit among all
men and among all states. Mo Tzu clearly recognized the rights of
people as a whole to live in a peaceful and orderly society. A useful
citizen works toward social unity. His sanction is that Heaven wills
good for all men and it is only correct to follow the will of Heaven.
The significance of Mohism lies in its essentially working-class
message: the inherent rights of all men to live in a righteous and
productive society.
Finally, as Taoists such as Lao Tzu (between sixth and fourth century
B.C.) and Chang Tzu (399-295 B.C.), advocate that man should
not be dominated by government at all, and that it is best to do
away with government and rulers and their regulations—best
because it is the way of things as they are. The philosophy of Tao
(the Way) clearly presupposes that man has the primordial right to
live according to Tao, because in a natural state man can be happy
before government is artificially introduced. An epigram from
Chang Tzu says: "When the sun rises I go to work; when the sun
sets I go to rest; I dig a well to drink and I plough the land to eat.
What does the power of the ruler have to do with me? 25 In the pregovernment era the natural man lives in accordance with nature
and lives happily. This seems to suggest that among all the rights a
man may have, the most basic and essential right is to be free from
interference from outside agencies such as governments. When the
right to be free from interference is guaranteed, as it should be in
virtue of the original Way, one has all the things he should have.
Against this Taoist background all the human rights one may cite
are relevant and meaningful only when governments become
necessary and pose a threat to individual existence, for only then
are such rights useful for the advancement of individual interests.

Human Rights: From Tradition to Modernity
After the unification by the first Emperor of Ch'in in 221 B.C.,
China underwent two millenia of political, social, and economic
changes which were only superficially marked by the rise and
decline of dynasties. Political and economic measures and institutions which may be said to reflect a growing consciousness of human rights do evolve. For example, the harshly cruel
punishments of antiquity are gradually abandoned from the turn of

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol1/iss1/9

12

Cheng: Human Rights in Chinese History and Chinese Philosophy
13
the Han period. But the dominating consideration in any political
reform is still the people's collective rights to well-being as
recognized by enlightened rulers and their intellectual Confucian
gentry-class bureaucrats or by independent-minded Confucian or
Buddhist scholars. Land ownership and taxation are major areas of
concern. Thoughtful and benevolent rulers and ministers always
take some steps to redistribute land or limit the size of land one can
own, or to lighten the tax or labor demands on the general peasantry. 26 In this sense, the strong concern for the well-being of the
people (primarily the general peasantry) by a benevolent ruler or
minister presupposes the belief that people as individuals do not
have the absolute right to own land, and that land belongs to the
state and must be shared to prevent exclusive and absolute
possession. This prevents or at least discourages the assumption of
ownership of land as a basis for a conception of individual human rights.
Between the establishment of the Ch'in Empire of the third century B.C. to the end of the Ch'ing (Manchu) Empire of the ninth
century, several factors seem to prevent an ultimate awakening of a
sense of individual human rights:
Although there are many dynastic changes throughout the
long history of China, each change leads to the establishment of a
despotic rule conceived in a framework (perhaps ultimately a Confucian one) in which a ruler's concern for the well-being of the
people is seen as stemming from a benevolence on his part. The
motivation for the numerous peasant uprisings is precisely to
protest against a malicious tyrant who ignores the well-being of
people, and to secure one who would be benevolent. Thus the successful uprisings eventually reaffirm the Confucian view of the
ruler and his duties toward people. They settle into the same old
form of despotic rule without instituting any apparatus to represent
consciously and permanently the standing interests of the people.
This tendency to revert to the same form of government, together
with the gradual erosion of governmental duties toward people, in
turn leads to another protest from the masses and another avowal
by a new dynasty, of the ruler's duties toward the people. Thus, the
dynastic cycle is founded: grass roots uprisings generated by a consciousness of the interests of people ending with the affirmation of
the duties of the ruler. This is clearly illustrated in the establishment
of the Han and Ming dynasties.
But there were also many unsuccessful peasant uprisings which
seem to pervert the initially people-oriented movements into ruler-
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oriented ones. 27 This is a remarkable fact, for which two reasons
can perhaps be given.
Chinese society is mainly based upon agriculture and
sustained by a massive peasantry who from ancient times have
adopted a passive attitude toward political authority. All the
peasantry wanted was noninterference and nonsuppression, as amply indicated in the Song of Chuang Tzu. Besides, they had been
subject to despotism and became accustomed to it as if it were the
only form of political rule. On the rational side, as opposed to the
institutional side, the Confucianism after Han had been taken up
by the rulers as a means for theoretically justifying the rule and its
accompanying bureaucracy. Peasantry educated under this
ideology certainly found it difficult to formulate any other
rationale for its critique or its repudiation. Not only was the mentality of the peasantry not conditioned to seek alternatives in
representing their interests in times of crisis; the peasants also felt
that they could rise to advantageous positions within the system
through avenues voluntarily opened for them by the bureaucracy
and the ruler. The recommendation system since the Han and the
civil examination system since the Sui Dynasty hypnotized people
into believing that advancement by steps was always available to
them in a well-maintained despotic system; they passively accepted
their misfortune in not being able to avoid suffering and poverty
and blamed it on their individual inabilities to move from mass
peasantry to scholar-gentry and to the bureaucratic ruling class.
Another factor which perhaps prevented human rights from
being effectively asserted by the mass of people had to do with the
constant invasions by barbarian border tribes. The existence of
border tensions added a critical note of solidarity to the people's
sense of cultural and historical identity, while the urgency of the
situation enhanced the ruler's freedom of action. The stress on
historical and cultural continuity and identity seemed to inhibit the
growth of the desire for the idea of human rights even when people
or scholars came to appreciate them. When the invading barbarians
succeeded in overrunning the native rule, as in the Yuan and early
Manchu periods, the people's situation became so much worse that
there could not be any talk of human rights as such.
Even though the main course of Chinese history maintained its
form of despotic rule as accompanied by consciousness of the
ruler's interest and a ruler's perspective on the importance of the
welfare of the people (peasants), it is not to be denied that there
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were frequent protestations to the contrary on the part of many
conscientious Confucianists. This was particularly true in the time
after Ming fell to the Manchus. In the philosophical and historical
writings of Huang Tsung-hsi (1619-1695) and Wang Fu-chih (16191692) one can find strong views rejecting despotic rule and strong
views cherishing the rights, of people as a whole. Whether these
views still centered on the collective rights of people rather than the
rights of individuals is open to controversy, "but the strength and
determination with which such views were held left no doubt that
there was a ferment in favor of new forms of government. After
Western powers made their encroachments on the old society
(which quickly revealed its weaknesses), and small industry in the
eighteenth century matured to the extent that the economic
autonomy of the populace could be foreseen, and finally after the
last monarchy refused to take quick and effective measures to
redress social ills, the scholars and people in the large cities
gradually came to see that a total revolution toward a different
form of political rule was the only solution. This explains the origin
of the Chinese Revolution in 1911, one of the goals of which was to
maintain the rights of people from the people's own point of view
by establishing a political form (democracy) which could prevent
the loss of this consciousness. Revolution in this sense had not yet
taken place in China whose mentality had been rooted in the ruleroriented Confucian ideology. It is this revolution which led to the
proclamation of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of China in
which articles regarding human rights, comparable to those in the
original Bill of Human Rights, were fully articulated.
A final point has to be made regarding the importance of the
development and growth of small industry and commerce in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The conditions which made
this development possible may signify a gradual shift from the
peasant mentality to one of initiative, open-mindedness, and a new
sensibility concerning social forms. It seems that even in the absence
of the calamity-loaded impact of the West, the Chinese masses
might have gradually come to some consciousness of human rights in
a manner resembling the development of British democracy. In this
fashion democracy and the affirmation of human rights might have
been slowly achieved without a massive and traumatic revolutionary
movement. Regarding this possibility and its merits neither history
nor speculation can make a definitive judgement.
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The Chinese M o d e l of Human Rights: A Conclusion
I have attempted to show two views of the concept of human
rights: (1) how human rights in a broad sense, that is, concerning
the interests of people as a whole, were conceived and practiced in
Chinese history and philosophy; and (2) how human rights in the
narrow and more Western sense of explicit and specific rights for
the individual man were actually lacking in the historical experience
and, perhaps, even political consciousness of China. I do not imply
any value judgments of this unique situation. A long history and a
very highly developed culture in China should give its own rationale.
No conclusions can be drawn until one fully understands the
reasons as well as the causes, the merits as well as the detriments, of a
a system lacking the Western sense of individual human rights
while encouraging the formation and sustenance of human rights in
a broad general sense. We can even consider human rights in the
Chinese context as a singular entity. This seems to suggest a
Chinese model of human rights opposed to the Western model as
found in the bills of rights listed in the introductory section of this
paper.
I wish to formulate the following characteristics of the Chinese
model. These would be human rights as abstracted from the actual
rights which Chinese people on a large scale enjoyed in their long
history and which Chinese philosophers in general, and Confucian
thinkers in particular, recognize and sanction:
(1) Human rights are relational as opposed to substantive. In the
Confucian code of social ethics man is defined by a system
of relationships to others. It is through relationships that one
develops oneself. There is no essence of man which in itself contains absolute or particular principles of virtue and disregards to
whom and at what time moral demands are made. The requirement
of reciprocity of Confucian ethics in the Great Learning
illustrates the relational value of human rights in the Chinese context. The Confucian notioji of li (rules of propriety) also manifests
the relational nature of human rights in the Chinese context. Even
though man shares with other men the intrinsic potentiality for
goodness (Jen),jen is not a human right per se. On the ground of
jen, one should not make a claim of rights for oneself but must accept others as a condition of the development of oneself. The
ultimate right in the substantial sense is the right of self-cultivation
and self-perfection. Relationships with others are governed by li
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based on the recognition of relatives and their worthiness, not on
claims to rights.
(2) Human rights are particularistic as opposed to universalistic.
As there is no explicit statement of the universal rights of man in
Chinese traditional law or government, what pertains to one's interest and what justifies one's action in terms of righteousness is
decided on the basis of particularistic considerations of context,
relationship, and time; of consequences as well as precedents. This
has been made partially clear above. Here what is to be stressed is
the particularistic way of applying or judging one's right in contexts,
relationships, and time. Often the appeal is made to human
feelings and the total good or the good of the whole. Human rights
become significant and compelling only when the total good and
the human feelings in the particular context, and not necessarily a
logical rationale, are observed.
(3) Human rights are collective as opposed to individual. This is
perhaps the most outstanding and most dominating feature of
human rights in the Chinese context. From antiquity to the present,
human rights are basically rights of the people as a whole rather
than rights of man as an individual. The term 'man' refers to man
in the sense of people as a singular entity rather than as individuals.
Even though the individual may not be totally dismissed from the
political consciousness of Chinese philosophy, the concept is not
as central as is that of the people as a whole. It is through the affirmation of the human rights of a group that the members of the
group naturally benefit. In the case of the affirmation of individual
human rights, there is always an implicit assumption that rights
must be relinquished under certain circumstances for the interests
of the total group. The collective nature of human rights as a principle of Chinese social ethics is well illustrated in the protection of
people as a whole by the ruler and in the preservation of the family
as a goal for individual living. I doubt that this concept of human
nature has ever really changed even in today's Chinese society.
(4) Finally, human rights are to be recognized by the authority,
not to be claimed by or for oneself. This is again typical of Confucian political theory as well as practice. No one individual can
claim his human rights as a reason for protest against the status
quo. However, one can revolt against the status quo by claiming
that the authority is not acting with that justice which would have
prevented such protest or revolt. Basically, Chinese individuals are self-effacing, but this is not to say that they do not en-
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joy or need human rights. These are assumed to be rationally and
normally required of and provided by a good social system or a
good system of rule. When these rights are perceived to be lacking,
there is risk of social disorder. Order and harmony mean implicit
mutual recognition of parties and groups existing in a relationship.
It is not a conscious and constant balance of power as guaranteed
by the judiciary supervision of standing courts. It was not until
modern times, slightly before the 1911 Revolution, and conspicuously in the 1919 May Fourth Movement, that Chinese individuals began to claim, and allow others to claim, human rights
for themselves and to enjoy the recognition of these rights by the
government.
University of Hawaii

NOTES
'it is often claimed that there were slaves attached to the lords and rulers in the
Shang time, but there is disagreement on this point, as there is about the exact percentage of the population who were slaves, how they were treated, and how they were
used in peacetime production and in war. For discussions of these points, see Kuo
mo-jo, Chung-Kuo ku-rai she-hui yen-chiu (The Study of Ancient Chinese Society),
Peking, 1964; and Lu Cheng-yu, Yin-Chou Shih-lai Ie Chung-kuo she-hui (Chinese
Society in the Yin-Chou Period), Peking, 1962.
See Shang Shu (Book of Documents), Pan-ken.
'see Shih Ching (Book of Poetry), Ta-ya.
See Shang Shu, Hung-fan.
5
Cf. Shu Ching, Ta-ya.
The inscriptions of Mao Kung Ting say, "[King] Wen and [King] Wu are greatly
illustrious. The Imperial Heaven substantiates their virtue in order to match the
Chou ancestors and enable its kings to receive the great mandate."
See Shang Shu, Hsien-yu-i-te.
See Tso Chuan, Duke Hsi, fifth year,
'ibid.
Ibid.; quoted from Shang Shu, Tsia-chung-chih-ming.
Chou Shu, Tai-shih; see Shang Shu, Tai-shih.
See Tso Chuan, Duke Hsiang, thirty-first year; quoted from Tsi-shih, first part.
In the Shih Ching, however, there are many songs which indicate the people's
desire for a happy life of abundance and peace, as well as for freedom from war and
heavy taxation.
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See Tso Chuan, Duke Hsi, nineteenth year; statement by Sung Ssu-ma Tzu and
Sui Chi-liang.
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See Tso Chuan, Duke Chuang, third year.
See Chou Li, Hsiao-shih-ko.
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"See Li Chi, Chu-li, 1.
See Lun Yu, Li-ien.
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The well-field system (ching-t'ien chih) and its economy had been introduced as
the basic mode of production, (a practice which he initiated) designed to serve both
the public and the private sector. This system could not accommodate the growing
population because it was based on a predesignated area of land which was overpopulated by the seventh century B.C.
Confucius projected the ideal forms of government and society into a golden age
of the past (a practice which he initiated). Since the society at present is regarded as
in degeneration and decline from the ideal past, men should awaken to a moral
responsibility for restoration of this ideal. Each man should have the ability to do
so, since it is assumed that the ideal had been already realized in the past.
Cf. Lun Yu, Tzu-lu.
This is called the doctrine of the rectification of names (cheng-ming). See Lun
Yu^ Tzu-lu.
This is a point which Confucius has also made. See Lun Yu, Wei-tzu.
24
See Mencius, Liang-hui-wang, 2. Mencius says: " T o harm benevolence is called
banditry; to harm righteousness is called cruelty. A man of banditry and cruelty is
called a lone person. I have heard about killing a lone person Chou [the last king of
Shang]; I have not heard about killing a king."
Chang Tzu, Yang-wang. This epigram is generally referred to as "Song of Hitting the Soil" (Chi-yang ko).
* Amnesty is sometimes declared for similar reasons.
Cf. Chung-kuo feng ch'ien she-hui nung-ming ch'an-chen Wen-t'i t'ao-lun chi
(Collection of Essays on Peasant Wars in Chinese Feudal Society), ed. Shih Shaoming, Peking, 1962.
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